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Trie problem of social change has long fascinated students of society. His-
torians, sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers have directed their
efforts toward a better understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. The results
of this labor have been varied. Some, and the names of Spengler, Sorokin, and
Arnold Toynbee come immediately to mind, have approached the problem in the grand
manner and produced broadly philosophical interpretations of the dynamics of
social change and of the life histories of civilizations and cultures. Others,
in somewhat more modest fashion, have confined their attention to revolutions as
a single aspect of social change, and have sought to expose the "anatomy" and
reveal the uniformities or "pattern" discernable in violent social upheavals.
These studies, stimulating in their own right for the panoramic breadth of
vision which they impart, are doubly valuable if they provide insights, concepts,
or tools of analysis which can profitably be applied to the study of a single
revolution, in a particular country, within a strictly limited period of time.
This paper is concerned with the application of Arnold J. Toynbee' s concepts of
Creative and Dominant Minorities to the role of the Cientificos in the genesis
of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 which destroyed the thirty- four year regime
of President Porfirio Diaz.
To be sure, the Mexican Republic, taken alone, does not constitute a civil-
ization in any sense comparable to Toynbee' s use of the term. Nor is it certain
that Western Christian Civilization, of which Mexico is a part, is in that pro-
cess of disintegration with which the ascendency of Dominant Minorities is asso-
ciated. However, if attention is shifted from the macrocosm of civilization and
focused on the microcosm of this particular revolutionary movement, one is im-
pressed by a series of striking and perhaps useful parallels.
Dominant Minorities, according to the hypothesis proposed in A Study of
History, are characterized by a lack of creative energy and original thinking,
qualities which are the hallmark of a Creative Minority's contribution to a grow-
ing civilization. Instead, Dominant Minorities tend to degenerate to a static,
defensive posture of social andmental fixity, in which an attempt is made to re-
tain by force a position of inherited privilege which they have ceased to merit
on the basis of creative accomplishment. This attempt to dominate a situation
in which it no longer commands the initiative causes the recalcitrant minority
to become a rigid, closed corporation refusing to hand over to other aspirants
a share in the oligarchy's jealously guarded privileges. Assuming the role of
predatory plutocrats, they become a bureaucracy obsessed with traditionalism and
past accomplishments, and affecting a detached, superior aloofness which alien-
ates them from the rest of society and further decreases their ability to adjust
to the realities of changing conditions.^
1See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (2 vols.; New York, 1926-1928), Piterim Sorokin,
Social And Cultural Dynamics (4 vols.; New fork, 1941), especially Vol.Ill, Fluctuation of
Social Relationships, War, and Revolution, and Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (6 vols.;London, 1934-1939).
n
See the bibliography on the study of revolution in Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolutio(New York, 1952), 297-315.
Creative Minorities, according to Toynbee, are associated with growing civilizations while
Dominant Minorities are characteristic of civilizations in the process of disintegtation. Toyn-
bee, A Study of History, TV, 280.
For a discussion of Dominant Minorities see Toynbee, op. cit.,V. 26-40
5 Ibid.. 31-32, 47, 390.
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The evidence suggests that the Cientificos followed a similar evolution in
their transformation from a Creative to a Dominant Minority in Mexican political
life between 1892 and 1910. From the inception of the group^ as the Union Liberal
in 1892 up to the sixth election of Diaz in 1903, the Cientificos had constituted
a constructive minority of creative thinkers and reformers, strongly influenced
by the currently popular Positivist Philosophy, and making a significant con-
tribution to Mexican political development through their open criticism of the
Diaz regime and consistent efforts to bring to Mexico the benefits of enlighten-
ed and scientific administration. As men of exceptional ability, they were re-
sponsible for much that was accomplished during the most productive period of
the Diaz regime. Even their detractors were forced to admit that they were the
intellectual aristocracy of the country, and should be credited almost exclu-
sively with the great strides made in Mexican economic development.
Then, about 1903, the group abdicated its position of critical opposition,
abandoned its reform program, was absorbed into the administration, began to
share in the spoils of the regime, and, as selfish defenders of a profitable
status quo, assumed a role characteristic of Dominant Minorities. Evidences of
this transition are not difficult to find. While Diaz did not immediately sur-
render the administration into the hands of nis former critics, the
"
anti-Cien-
tifico" complex which had characterized his earlier administration was quietly
abandoned. In December of 1902, Bernardo Reys, Minister of War and a violent
opponent of the Cientificos , was removed from his post by the President at theinsistence of the Cienti'ficos . A year later, in 1903, came another indication
of the increasing dominance of the Cientificos in the administration. Both in
1896i and in 1900 Diaz had turned to the National Porfirista Circle, enemies of
the Cientificos, to promote his reelection. Recalling the critical Cienti fico
program of 1892, he had been careful to prevent another convention of the Union
Liberal. Now, however, the situation had changed to such an extent that Diaz
turned to the Cientificos to promote his sixth reelection, and a second Union
Liberal Convention was permitted to convene in Mexico City in June of 1903.
As further compensation for having made their peace with the dictator, on
May 6, 1904, the Cientificos were granted another of their long-standing demands.
On that date Diaz permitted the reestablishment of the office of vice-president,
a move which he had consistently opposed in the past, since vice-presidents had
often been a source o£ intrigue against the chief executive. The election of
Ramon Corral, a Cienti fico ally and Minister of Gobernacion since 1903, was a
clear-cut victory for the group.
This change in the policy of Diaz toward the Cientificos is due in large
measure to the changed attitude of the Cientificos themselves. Abandoning theirliberal, reforming impulse and their original ideal of social progress for the
good of the nation, they became increasingly materialistic, and turned their
talents to converting their influential position within the administration into
personal financial gain. This shift from political reform to the harmless con-
While references to the Cientificos as the sinister 'brain trust" behind the Diaz regime arenumerous, no reasonably complete account of their activities has appeared in English. See Char-les C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, Genesis under Madero (Austin, Texas, 1952), 10-12 andHoward F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, 1953), 52-56, 433-434.
Testimony of Henry Lane Wilson, United States Ambassador to Mexico. U. S. Congress, Senate,Investigation ofMexican Affairs. Preliminary report and hearing of the Committee on Foreigndelations, 66th. Congress, 2nd. Session, on Senate Resolution 106 (2 vols.: Washington, 1920),II, 2255; Ricardo^Garcia Granados, Historia de Mexico desde la restauracio'n de la republica en
1867 hasta la caida de Porfirio Diaz (Mexico, 1911), 266.ft yLuis Cabrera, Obras Politicas delLic. Bias Vrrea. recopilacion de escritos publicados durantelosanosde 1909, 1910. 1911. y 1912 (Mexico, 1921), 3-8; Jose Lopez-Portillo y Rojas, Elevacio'ny caida de Porfirio Diaz (Mexico, 1921), 263.
9 *F. Vasquez Gomez, Memorias Politicas. 1903-1913 (Mexico, 1933), llff.
Ramon Prida, De la Dictadura a la Anarquia. Apuntes para la historia politico de Mexico dur-
"nte los ultimos cuarenta y tres mos (El Paso, Texas, 1914), 96-97, 156, 165.
Lopez, Elevacio'n y caida, 248-254.
12 •Prida, Dictadura a laAnarquia, 264; Vasquez Gomez, Memorias Politicas. 14.13 'Lopez, Elevacio'n y Caida, 261
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cerns of influence peddling was more to the dictator's liking. Willing to over-
look their economic opportunism, Diaz saw them now as a group whose talents could
be useful to his administration without being a source of embarrassment. Their
very success in these new intrigues, however, ultimately caused them to fall in-
to the disrepute which is so universally associated with this group in the lit-
erature of the Mexican Revolution. "
Under these conditions it is not surprising to find in the final years of
the Diaz administration the development of a system known as cientificismo. The
system can hardly be described in the usual terms of a political party seeking
its share of patronage and spoils. Party politics as such scarcely existed in
Mexico at the turn of the century. Toynbee suggests that Dominant Minorities
typically detach themselves from the rest of society and affect a detached al-
most snobbish aloofness which alienates them from the public generally.^ The
Cientificos reveal this same esotericism. They had little voluntary connection
with the people, did not seek popular support or converts, did not represent
the aspirations of the masses of the Republic, had little interest in affairs be-
yond their personal advancement, and, after abandoning the reform program of
1892, had no established platform of guiding principles.
The Cientificos became, in short, a sort of intra-governmental clique,
brain trust, " or corporation directed by a small group of admittedly capable
men
--
a bureaucratic brotherhood held together by the cohesive power of public
plunder and dedicated to the exploitation of the resources of the country, not
by means of actual crime, but by official and quasi legal means. Toynbee' s des-
cription of a "discreetly predatory plutocracy" as representative of Dominant
Minorities seems to catch the spirit of c ient ificismo with remarkable preci-
sion. 1'
Many of the Cientificos were lawyers. Their influence in government circles
enabled them to arrange or
*fix"matters in the national palace, legislative
chambers, courts, and public offices. Laws were enacted and enforced with care-
ful attention to the individuals involved." Outsiders competing with the oli-
garchy were in a position of relative inferiority, and were unable to arrange
and organize the large-scale enterprises and monopolies which were Cientifico
specialties. As a result, they were in great demand by foreign companies to ar-
range concessions of all types. As a financial and political oligarchy, the
Cientificos recognized their vested interest in the government of President Diaz
and were obsessed by the desire to preserve the existing order. *
In their efforts to maintain an advantageous status quo and prevent intru-
sion upon their preserve, the Cientificos were obliged to become aclosed clique.
Their distrust of the masses and their consequent policy of exclusiveness pro-
voked popular references to "el carro completo" -- the full car. There were no
seats, not even standing room. Even though the bureaucracy had grown tremen-
dously and by 1910 included most literate Mexicans, these lesser civil servants
were allowed no voice in shaping the cient ifico-dominated policies of the ad-
ministration. The rising generation of educated Creoles was excluded from the
U. S. Congress (Senate), Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 88, 2254-2255. See also Henry
Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (New York, 1927), 199.
15 Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 233-234, V, 390.
16 Lopez, Elevacio'n y Caida. 272-273.
Toynbee, A Study of History, V, 40. Representative accusations against rampant cientific-ismo can be found in E. D. Trowbridge, Mexico, Today and Tomorrow (New York, 1919), 98; Edward
IBell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New York, 1914), 22, and Lopez, Elevacion y Co/do. 273.
Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, An Interpretation of Mexico (New York. 1933) 100-101.
Luis Cabrera (Bias Urrea), Veinte Anos Despues (Mexico, 1937), 259; Roque Estrada, La Revo-
lucio'n y Francisco I.Madero (Guadalajara, 1912), 25.
-
Trinidad Sanches Santos, Editorialet de 'El Pais" en 1910, 1911, y 1912, compiled by M. L.
Sanchez (Mexico, 1923), 78. Editorial of July 21, 1910, *E1 Enigma."See also Francisco Bulnes,
The Whole Truth About Mexico (New York, 1916), 214.
21 Carleton Beals asserts that virtually all literate middle class Mexicans were on the govern-
ment payroll in some capacity or other. Carleton Beals, Porfirio Diaz, Dictator of Mexico(Philadelphia. 1932). 231.
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truly important public posts where their more liberal views might have tempered
or moderated the harsh Positivism of the Diaz regime. This unwillingness to
admit younger men and absorb fresh ideas gradually transformed the administration
into an old man's government, hopelessly out of touch with the changing spirit
of the times.
At the head of this gerontocracy was a dictator already past 80 years of
age. Of the 8 cabinet members, 2 were past 80 and the youngest was 55. of 20
state governors, 2 were past 80, 6 past 70, and 17 past 60. Government office
was looked upon as an asylum for loyal patriarchs. These men, reelected and re-
appointed over a period of 30 years, "owned" their posts with the consent of
Diaz and allowed no younger men to trespass. Because of the number of mummies
they contained, journalists flippantly referred to the government offices as'"
the Pyramids of Teotihuacan.
"
Luis Cabrera summarized the extent of Cientifico domination by 1910 by as-
serting that both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were effectively dominated,
though often indirectly, by the Cientificos .^ Of 51 senators, 25 were Cien-
iificos. Of 230 deputies, 118 were tools of the Cientificos. Inthe supreme court
and other high offices the same situation prevailed. After 1900 these bodies were
converted into mere subsidiaries of the central Cientifico machine. Cabrera con-
cludes that 75 per cent of the public employees retained their position only
through Cientifico influence.
*
Thus, it can be seen that after 1903 the Cientificos adopted another of the
expedients characteristic of Dominant Minorities: the tendency to degenerate into
a rigid, static, closed corporation seeking to retain their position by force and
influence alone. "> Though Mexico was changing, their philosophy of outdated Posi-
tivism and economic materialism had assumed the legendary rigidity of the un-
changing laws of the Medes and Persians. Although the peripheral membership of
the group did increase, the privileged inner circle of the oligarchy refused to
admit other and younger aspirants to a share in the direction of Mexico's social
and political development. ° The resistence to change expressed in the
"
full car"
psychology is evidence of the degeneration of a Creative Minority into a merely
dominant bureaucracy inimical to continued creativity.
The efforts of a recalcitrant minority to retain its hold on the country by
direct and forceful means are revealed in the Cientificos
'
willinguse of the
strong arm of the dictator to crush outspoken opponents, and in their resort to
a controlled press in an effort to prevent embarrassing criticism. Through Reyes
Spindola, owner and editor of El Imparcial , the Cientificos controlled the lead-
ing daily newspaper of Mexico City. As the
"
semi-official organ" of the Cien-
tificos, the paper prospered accordingly.
'
Numerous charges were made that
El Imparcial received a handsome government subsidy and that, in addition, the
Cientifico paper monopoly raised the price of newsprint for opposing papers.
*°
In addition to El Imparcial, El Debate, the mouthpiece of Vice-president Ramon
Corral, and El Diario, controlled by Cientifico Enrique Creel, were used by the
group to further their interests. Editors who were too critical and outspoken
were forced to lead a precarious opposition existence.
By virtue of their dominant position in the administration, the members of
the oligarchy were able to exploit the routine functions of government for their
personal benefit. Through the Treasury, they were able to dominate the other
government departments by means of a law giving Minister of Finance Jose Liman-
tour, a Cientifico, surveillance over their budgets. Through the medium of the
22 Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, 27-29; Tannenbaum, Peace ky Revolution, 132-133.
23 Cabrera, Obras Poli'ticas. 87-116.
u ma.
25 Toynbee, A Study of History. V, 26-31
26 Toynbee, op. at., V, 32-33.
27 Walter F. McCaleb, "The Press in Mexico," Hisp an ic American Historical Review III(1920)
444-445.
28 fCabrera, Obras Politicas, 59-68; Carlo de Fornaro, Mexico Tal Qual Es (InternationalPublish-
ing Company, 1909), 119.
29 ¦* 'Lopez, Elevaeion y Caida, 267.
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Compania Bancaria de Obras y Bienes Raices, government manipulators were provid-
ed with a convenient cloak for their fiscal intrigues. Through the Bancaria,
officials were able to conceal their identity and to take government contracts
or obtain government concessions without undesirable publicity.
Of the many areas of Cientifico activity, the most significant in arousing
ant i-Cientifico sentiment was the matter of concessions and monopolies. In the
case of foreign concessions, the complaint was that the concessions were excess-
ively favorable and that the Cientificos received scandalous fees for arranging
them. Then too, the Cientificos were guilty of securing for themselves monopolies
of all kinds in violation of Article 28 of the Constitution prohibiting exclusive
monopolies. Special protective legislation was enacted to cover their particular
products and to guarantee exorbitant profits to the favored few. •**¦ In legisla-
tion relating to banking, tariffs, taxation, land policy, and the nationaliza-
tion of railways, the public was convinced that it could see the hand of the
Cientifico manipulators. Rumor and scandal were widespread in spite of the fact
that many concessions were not nearly as profitable and many administration
programs hardly as scandalous as was popularly believed.
A catalog of Cientifico misdeeds could be extended to considerable length.
The literature of the Revolutionary Era is filled with accusations. The figures
and data are seldom dispassionate and are often unreliable. It would be naive
to assume that the Cientifico oligarchy was free of guilt. It is beyond question
that various members of the group did take advantage of their favored position
to grow immensely wealthy. On the other hand, the manipulations of some were
popularly credited to the entire group, and cientificismo became synonomous in
the public mind with the manipulation of public affairs for private plunder.
*
That many of these accusations were false did not serve to change the popu-
lar stereotype or still the public clamor. In every instance Cientifico motives
were assumed to be of the worst. Their dealings as representatives of foreign
interests led to the popular impression that they were mere tools of foreign
powers, and they became the focus of a rampant anti- foreign sentiment. The armed
supression of anti- foreign demonstrations by the government was interpreted as
clear evidence of a sinister relationship between the Cientificos , the govern-
ment, and foreigners. For those who remembered, the philosophy of the original
Cientificos , that of importing a foreign brand of scientific progress through a
use of foreign capital and talent, only added to the growing sentiment that the
Cientificos were responsible for making
*Mexico the mother of foreigners and the
stepmother of Mexicans. "
The Cientificos of the dominant period, however, were not themselves con-
cerned with their former stature and ideals as a creative minority. Their pride,
their arrogance, their contempt for all outside the oligarchy, fed a constantly
growing wave of anti-Cien t ifico sentiment. Under the circumstances, a clash be-
tween them and the masses was inevitable. The unsavory details of the past ten
years were not easily ignored nor forgotten. From all quarters came the symptoms
of a growing discontent.
The Creelman Interview of 1908 had done much to arouse the smouldering re-
sentment. Madero' s La Succesion Presidencial en 1910 published late in 1908 made
him a rallying point for the opposition. Rival political parties began to cam-
paign openly. Books and pamphlets aimed at the oligarchy appeared in increasing
numbers. In 1909 Andres Molina Enriques published his Los Grandes Problemas
30 Bell, Political Shame ofMexico, 7.
31 W. H. Calcott , Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1931) 140. Typical of the ac-
cusations are the statements made by Pedro Gonzales-Blanco, De Porfirio Diaz a Carrania (Madrid
1916), 38.
32 U. S. Congress (Senate), Investigation of Mexican Affairs, I, 1444.
33 See Cline, The United States and Mexico, 433-434.
Francisco Madero who led the revolution to overthrow Diaz and cienti ficismo admits that
many of the rumors and claims are unfounded and exaggerated. Francisco I.Madero, La Succsitin
Presidencial en 1910 (Mexico, 1911), 123ff.
35 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington, 1918), 353-
354.
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Nacionales in which, with telling effect, he revealed the extent of Cientifico
domi" ati°n* The regime was able to assure its return to office in 1910 only by
resorting to that characteristic device of the Dominant Minority, crude and
forceful supression of the opposition.
The campaign of 1910 should have furnished Diaz and the Cientificos with
ample warning of the approaching storm. The events of that year certainly pro-
vided ammunition for the opponents of the oligarchy. It made little difference
to the people whether or not all the charges and accusations made against the
minority were true or whether their complicity in all the scandals credited to
them could actually be established. The significant point was that the public
believed the things they heard, and it was this belief that swelled the ranks of
maderistas. They knew that the door of opportunity was closed to them because of
the
*full car" policy. They could not speak, write, or publish with impunity.
They could not enter politics because the events of the last campaign indicated
that in reality politics still were not permitted. They could not hold offices,
these were preempted by the Cientifico gerontocracy.
Thus, one of the causes of the revolt that dethroned Diaz was hatred of
dominant cientificisno, a hatred revealed in the revolutionary battle cry, "Death
to the d en tificos '."The revolution was not simply against Diaz as a tyrant,
but against the Cientificos who surrounded him. Itwas a revolt against the
social and mental fixityof the closed corporation, against the business monopoly
of dominant cient ificismo, against the rigid preservation of a system of special
privilege, and finally, against a philosophy of government, once creative and
constructive, but now purely negative and little more than an elaborate ration-
alization to justify the continued ascendency of the Dominant Minority. Itwas,
in short, the Mexican repudiation of those qualities which, according to the
Toynbee thesis, are universally characteristic of Dominant Minorities.
A letter of American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to his government dated
November 26., 1910, points up the special vengeance of the masses for the Cien-
tificos, even greater, perhaps, than their dislike of the dictator himself. He
reports, "there is deep animosity on all hands. ... to the Cientifico group which
surrounds the President, and in my opinion, it is only respect and fear of the
President which restrains a formidable movement.
Even as Wilson wrote of a "formidable movement," the revolution was already
in progress. Francisco Madero had already issued his Plan of San Luis Potosi
calling the people to arms. In spite of the President's last-minute offers of
liberal reforms, the revolution spread rapidly, moved beyond control, and tri-
umphed. On May 25, 1911, Diaz resigned the Presidency, and with his fall, cien-
tificisno as the institutionalized expression of a Dominant Minority ceased to
exist.
One may well conclude that the role of the Cientificos in the long Diaz
administration was an important one indeed. The picture of Pre-revolutionary
Mexico can hardly be understood without constant reference to that unique group.
Much of the controversey and misunderstanding surrounding the Cientificos stems
from a failure to emphasi ze the distinction between the group as a truly Creative
Minority, and, later on, as a merely Dominant Minority.
Itis in helping to point up this contrast that the Toynbee concepts seem
helpful. Itis granted that any extremely literal application of these concepts
to the specifics of the Mexican case is out of the question.
36 Jose Fernandez Rojas, De Porfirio Dial a Victoriana Haer to, 1910-1913 (Mexico, 1913), 129.
37 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relationi of the United Staff. 1911. 367-368.
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